Clark: Tel-Oren, Filartiga, and the Meaning of the Alien Tort Statute

Tel-Oren, Filartiga, and the Meaning of the

Alien Tort Statute
Bradford R. Clarkt
INTRODUCTION

Judge Robert Bork was one of the most influential legal
thinkers of the twentieth century. His work as a scholar and a
federal judge has had extraordinary influence in shaping the
law. This influence is well known in the field of antitrust law,
which Judge Bork transformed with the publication of The Antitrust Paradox., But his influence has extended into many other
areas as well, such as standing,2 free speech,3 and originalism.4
One area that has received somewhat less attention is his interpretation of the Alien Tort Statutes (ATS). Although most commentators understandably focus on the importance of the Second Circuit's earlier opinion in Filartiga v Pena-Irala,6 Judge
Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic7 more accurately anticipated how the Supreme Court would ultimately interpret the statute.

t William Cranch Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University
Law School. I thank AJ. Bellia and John Manning for insightful comments and suggestions.
1 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (Basic Books
1978). For works describing Bork's influence, see George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence

of The Antitrust Paradox, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol 455, 458 (2008); William E. Kovacic,
The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 Wayne L Rev 1413, 1444-45 (1990). Judge Bork also wrote an influential
antitrust opinion as a judge. See Rothery Storage & Van Co v Atlas Van Lines, Inc, 792

F2d 210 (DC Cir 1986).
2
See Allen u Wright, 468 US 737, 750 (1984), quoting Vander Jagt v O'Neill, 699
F2d 1166, 1178-79 (DC Cir 1983) (Bork concurring); Haitian Refugee Center v Gracey,
809 F2d 794, 811-16 (DC Cir 1987).
3 See Ollman u Evans, 750 F2d 970, 993-1010 (DC Cir 1984) (en banc) (Bork
concurring).
4
See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 Ind L J 1 (1971).
5
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, ch 20, 1 Stat 73, 76-77, codified as amended at 28 USC

§ 1350.
6

7

630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
726 F2d 774 (DC Cir 1984).
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The ATS was enacted by the First Congress as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.8 As enacted in 1789, the statute provided
that "the district courts ... shall [] have cognizance, concurrent
with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the
case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."9
The statute was rarely invoked and fell into obscurity for almost
two centuries. In 1980, however, the Second Circuit interpreted
the statute in Filartigato allow foreign citizens to sue other foreign citizens for violations of modern customary international
law that occurred outside the United States.o Four years later,
the DC Circuit in Tel-Oren rejected the Second Circuit's approach. In a per curiam opinion, the DC Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of an ATS suit between aliens, but each member of the
panel-Judges Harry Edwards, Robert Bork, and Roger Robbissued a separate opinion to explain his reasons for doing so.11
Judge Bork's opinion stated that it was "guided chiefly by
separation of powers principles, which caution courts to avoid
potential interference with the political branches' conduct of foreign relations."12 A similar emphasis on separation of powers
was clearly evident in the Supreme Court's subsequent opinions
in Sosa v Alvarez-Machainl3 and Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.14 To understand these opinions, it is useful to examine the
leading lower court opinions that preceded them. This examination reveals that the Supreme Court's approach has much more
in common with Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren than the Second Circuit's opinion in Filartiga.
I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S APPROACH IN FILARTIGA
Filartigawas a suit brought in federal court by citizens of
Paraguay against another citizen of Paraguay for wrongfully
causing their son's death in Paraguay by the use of torture.15
The Second Circuit allowed the suit to proceed under the ATS
because it concluded that "deliberate torture perpetrated under
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 76-77.
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9(c), 1 Stat at 76-77.
See Filartiga,630 F2d at 884-89.
11 See Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 775-98 (Edwards concurring); id at 798-823 (Bork concurring); id at 823-27 (Robb concurring).
12 Id at 799 (Bork concurring).
13 542 US 692 (2004).
14
133 S Ct 1659 (2013).
15 Filartiga,630 F2d at 878, 889.
8

9
10
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color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of
the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties."16 According to the court, an alien may sue
an alleged torturer found and served in the United States under
the ATS because such a suit alleges a tort in violation of the law
of nations within the meaning of the statute. 17 A suit between aliens, however, does not obviously fall within the limited subject
matter jurisdiction of federal courts conferred by Article III. The
Second Circuit answered this concern by stating that the law of
nations "has always been part of the federal common law,"18 and
thus suits between aliens under the ATS arise under federal law
for purposes of Article III. The court recognized that its "reasoning might also sustain jurisdiction under the general federal
question provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331." Nonetheless, the court
preferred to base its decision on the ATS given the close coincidence between the subject matter of the statute and "the jurisdictional facts presented in this case." 19
The Second Circuit's claim that the law of nations has always been part of federal common law was unsubstantiated and
anachronistic. Federal common law is a modern development. It
was not until the twentieth century that the Supreme Court recognized "federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced
directly by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands."20 To be sure, federal courts
previously applied certain branches of the law of nations in the
exercise of their Article III jurisdiction-particularly their admiralty and diversity jurisdiction.21 At the Founding, the law of nations consisted of three major branches: the law merchant, the
law maritime, and the law of state-state relations.22 Federal

16

Id at 878.

17

Id.
Id at 885.

18

19 Filartiga,630 F2d at 887 & n 22 (attributing the "paucity of suits successfully
maintained under [the Alien Tort Statute]" to the difficulty of establishing a violation of
the law of nations, rather than a controversy over proper jurisdiction).
20 Richard H. Fallon Jr, et al, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 607 (Foundation 6th ed 2009). See also Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy
Clause Textualism, 110 Colum L Rev 731, 741 (2010) ("The modern conception of federal
common law-judge-made law that binds both federal and state courts-simply did not
exist circa 1788.").
21 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of
Nations, 109 Colum L Rev 1, 39-40 (2009).
22 See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A StructuralReinterpretation, 144
U Pa L Rev 1245, 1280-81 (1996).
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courts applied the law merchant (or general commercial law)
under the Swift doctrine in diversity cases. 23 Such law was never
considered federal law, did not preempt contrary state law, and
did not support arising-under jurisdiction.24 That is why, in
overruling the Swift doctrine, the Court in Erie Railroad Co v
Tompkins25 complained that the doctrine "made rights enjoyed
under the unwritten 'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court."26 If
the law merchant had been federal common law, then it would
have applied equally in federal and state court.
A second branch of the law of nations-the law maritimewas also long considered general rather than federal law. The
law maritime was a body of customary law that traditionally
governed matters on the high seas. In American Insurance Co v
Canter,27 the Marshall Court held that "[a] case in admiralty
does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the
United States."28 Rather, admiralty "cases are as old as navigation itself; and the law, admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise."29
In other words, federal courts exercising admiralty and maritime jurisdiction were applying general law rather than federal
law. The Court's conception of general maritime law changed
somewhat in Southern Pacific Co v Jensen,30 in which the Court
held that state law is preempted if it "works material prejudice
to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in
its international and interstate relations."31 Even this questionable ruling32 does not support Filartiga'sassertion that the law
of nations has always been considered federal common law and

See Swift u Tyson, 41 US (16 Pet) 1, 18 (1842).
See Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court,
54 Wm & Mary L Rev 655, 660 (2013).
25 304 US 64 (1938).
26 Id at 74-75.
27 26 US (1 Pet) 511 (1828).
28 Id at 545.
29 Id at 545-46.
30 244 US 205 (1917).
23
24

31

Id at 216.

See Clark, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1354-60 (cited in note 22) (arguing that many
modern rules governing private maritime cases are difficult to square with the constitutional structure). See also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 Geo Wash L Rev 273,
328 (1999) (explaining that the Court's approach since Jensen is inconsistent with Erie
and the constitutional structure).
32
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thus supports arising-under jurisdiction. First, Jensen was decided in 1917 and was arguably the Court's first embrace of true
federal common law. Second, Canter remains good law even after Jensen.33 This means that although general maritime law
may preempt contrary state law, it does not provide a basis for
arising-under jurisdiction within the meaning of Article III.
The third branch of the law of nations-the law of statestate relations-was also routinely treated as general law rather
than federal law, at least until the Supreme Court's decision in
Erie in 1938. The law of state-state relations governed the rights
and obligations of sovereign states vis-A-vis one another. The
most important of these rights were known as "perfect rights,"
and their violation gave the offended nation just cause for retaliation (including war). 34 In recent work, Professor A.J. Bellia and
I have argued that federal courts have applied the law of statestate relations since the Founding to the present, not as a form
of federal common law implied from Article III, but as a means
of upholding the precise allocation of war and foreign-relations
powers to the political branches of the federal government set
forth in Articles I and 11.35 The Supreme Court has yet to rule
definitively on this question, and it is not clear that cases arising under the law of state-state relations support arising-under
jurisdiction absent the incorporation of such law by the political
branches in a statute or treaty. 36
In light of this background, Filartiga'sstatement that the
law of nations "has always been part of the federal common law"
is unsupportable.37 Moreover, even if the First Congress understood the law of nations (or one or more of its three traditional
branches) as federal common law, the Second Circuit never explained why that conclusion would justify interpreting the ATS's
reference to "the law of nations" as including modern customary
international law. When the ATS was adopted in 1789, the
phrase "the law of nations" had a well-known meaning. It did

33 See, for example, Paduano v Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F2d 615,
618 (1955).
34 Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 16-17 (cited in note 21).
35 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 Va L Rev 729, 743-44 (2012).
36 See Bergman v De Sieyes, 170 F2d 360, 361 (2d Cir 1948) ("Whether an avowed
refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension of it, would present a federal question we need not consider, for neither is present here.")
37 Filartiga,630 F2d at 885.
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not include modern norms of customary international law that
restrict how nations or their officials may treat their own citizens in their own territory. To be sure, such restrictions are now
part of modern international human rights law, but such restrictions were unknown to the law of nations. Indeed, the law of
nations itself recognized territorial sovereignty and prohibited
other nations from interfering with the conduct of nations within their own territory. 38 From this perspective, Filartigawas a
well-meaning but anachronistic reading of the ATS.
II. JUDGE BORK'S APPROACH IN TEL-OREN
Four years after Filartiga,the DC Circuit in Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic declined to apply the Second Circuit's approach.39 Israeli citizens sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Libya, and several other organizations, alleging that
the defendants committed several torts in violation of the law of
nations for their involvement in an armed attack on a civilian
bus in Israel that killed and injured civilians. According to the
plaintiffs, these torts included terrorism, torture, and genocide.40
The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint in a brief per curiam opinion, and all three judges
wrote separate concurrences. Judge Harry Edwards was sympathetic to Filartiga'sapproach to the ATS, but suggested that the
statute allowed federal courts to hear only a limited number of
cases alleging violations of established international law-such
as genocide, slavery, and systematic racial discrimination.41 In
this case, Judge Edwards concluded that the PLO's actions
against civilians did not rise to the level of a claim under the
statute. 42 The other judges on the panel took even more restrictive approaches. Judge Roger Robb concluded that the dispute
involved a nonjusticiable political question and that courts
lacked judicially manageable standards to determine the international legal status of terrorism. In his view, courts should
leave such politically sensitive issues to the executive branch for
diplomatic resolution.43

38

39
40
41
42
43

See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 18 (cited at note 21).
Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 811-13 (Bork concurring).
Id at 775.
See id at 781 (Edwards concurring).
See id at 781, 796 (Edwards concurring).
See Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 826-27 (Robb concurring).
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Judge Robert Bork concluded that the ATS was solely a jurisdictional statute that conferred no cause of action.44 In the
course of his opinion, Judge Bork made several important points
that may have influenced the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of the ATS. First, he stressed that "it is essential
that there be an explicit grant of a cause of action before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of international
law in a federal tribunal."45 He noted that the Second Circuit in
Filartigaassumed without explanation that Congress's grant of
jurisdiction also created a cause of action. He characterized that
assumption as "fundamentally wrong and certain to produce
pernicious results."46 His conclusion was guided by general principles of separation of powers "that apply whenever a court of
the United States is asked to act in a field in which its judgment
would necessarily affect the foreign policy interests of the [United States]."47

Second, he stressed the constitutional separation of powers.
In his view, "[t]he crucial element of the doctrine of separation of
powers in this case is the principle that '[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-"the political"Departments."'48 In this case, if federal courts recognized an implied cause of action allowing Israelis to sue the defendants for
terrorist activities, they would "raise substantial problems of judicial interference with nonjudicial functions, such as the conduct of foreign relations."49 Moreover, Judge Bork believed that
"[a]djudication of international disputes of this sort in federal
courts, disputes over international violence occurring abroad,
would be far more likely to exacerbate tensions with other nations than to promote peaceful relations."50 For these reasons, he

thought that separation of powers counseled judicial restraint.
Third, Judge Bork offered some speculative thoughts regarding the original meaning of the ATS. He began by rejecting
See id at 820 (Bork concurring).
Id at 801 (Bork concurring).
46 Id (Bork concurring).
47 Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 801 (Bork concurring). For the argument that there is no
general doctrine of separation of powers untethered from specific provisions of the Constitution, see John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124
Harv L Rev 1939, 2004-05 (2011).
48
Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 801 (Bork concurring), quoting Oetjen v CentralLeather Co,
246 US 297, 302 (1918).
49 Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 804 (Bork concurring).
50 Id at 816 (Bork concurring).
44
45
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Filartiga'sbroad reading of the statute to authorize a cause of
action whenever the plaintiff alleges a violation of international
law. This reading was foreclosed, he argued, by the fact that it
"would have to apply equally to actions brought to recover damages for torts committed in violation of treaties" because the
ATS extends jurisdiction to suits for torts in violation of both
treaties and the law of nations.51 Allowing such suits under treaties "would render meaningless, for alien plaintiffs, the wellestablished rule that treaties that provide no cause of action
cannot be sued on without (express or implied) federal law authorization."52 Filartiga'sapproach would also be "too sweeping"
because it "would authorize tort suits for the vindication of any
international legal right."53 This approach would be inconsistent
both with the limitations on individual enforcement inherent in
international law itself and with the constitutional limits on the
role of federal courts. 54
In light of the foregoing, Judge Bork thought that courts
should reject Filartiga'sbroad reading of the ATS unless it could
be shown that the First Congress intended that result when it
enacted the statute. Judge Bork found no evidence to support
that conclusion. As he put it, he had "discovered no direct evidence of what Congress had in mind when enacting the provision."5> For this reason, he interpreted the statute (narrowly) in
light of the Founders' goal of opening "federal courts to aliens for
the purpose of avoiding, not provoking, conflicts with other nations."56

Although it was unnecessary to his decision, Judge Bork
spent several pages speculating "what [the ATS] may have been
enacted to accomplish, if only to meet the charge that my interpretation is not plausible because it would drain the statute of
meaning." 57 He turned to Blackstone-"a writer certainly familiar to colonial lawyers"-and explained that Blackstone had
identified three principal offenses against the law of nations incorporated by the municipal law of England: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.58
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id at 812 (Bork concurring).
Id (Bork concurring).
Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 812 (Bork concurring).
See id (Bork concurring).
Id (Bork concurring).
Id (Bork concurring).
Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 813 (Bork concurring).
Id (Bork concurring).
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According to Judge Bork, "One might suppose that these were
the kinds of offenses for which Congress wished to provide tort
jurisdiction for suits by aliens in order to avoid conflicts with
other nations."5 Judge Bork admitted that these thoughts as to
the possible original intention underlying the ATS were "speculative," but he offered them "merely to show that the statute
could have served a useful purpose even if the larger tasks assigned to it by Filartiga .

.

. are rejected."60 Although Judge

Bork's ideas about the original meaning of the ATS were speculative, the Supreme Court ultimately embraced them in two
subsequent decisions.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH

The Supreme Court interpreted the ATS for the first time in
2004 in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain.61 Alvarez (a Mexican doctor)
sued Sosa (a Mexican national), other Mexican nationals, four
United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents,
and the United States for kidnapping Alvarez in Mexico and
bringing him to the United States to stand trial for the alleged
torture and murder of a DEA agent in Mexico.62 The district
court dismissed the claims against the US defendants, leaving
only a suit between aliens. The Supreme Court held that federal
courts lacked jurisdiction to hear this claim under the ATS.63 In
the course of its opinion, the Court echoed each of the three major points made by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren.
The Sosa Court began by holding that "the statute is in
terms only jurisdictional."64 The Court characterized as "implausible" the plaintiffs argument that "the ATS was intended not
simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the creation
of a new cause of action for torts in violation of international
law."65 Rather, the text of the statute, its placement in the Judiciary Act, and "the distinction between jurisdiction and cause of
action" known to the Founders all supported the conclusion that
Id at 813-14 (Bork concurring).
Id at 815 (Bork concurring). My coauthor and I have recently offered our own
understanding of the original meaning of the ATS. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U Chi L Rev 445, 50710 (2011).
61 See Sosa, 542 US at 712.
62 Id at 697-98.
63 See id at 712, 724-25.
64 Id at 712.
65 Sosa, 542 US at 713.
59

60
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"the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action."66
At the same time, the Court believed that federal courts
could hear a limited number of claims that the First Congress
might have had in mind when it enacted the ATS. According to
the Court, the "jurisdictional grant is best read as having been
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international
law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
time."67 Like Judge Bork, the Court looked to Blackstone in order to identify the kinds of claims that the First Congress intended federal courts to hear under the ATS. According to the
Court, "we have found no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond those torts corresponding to Blackstone's
three primary offenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement
of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy."68
Nonetheless, the Court left open the possibility that federal
courts have limited power to recognize new claims "based on the
present-day law of nations" so long as they "rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized."69 Although this formulation appears to be more expansive than Judge Bork's approach to the
ATS, the Court offered five reasons "for judicial caution" that
would limit the exercise of this power.70 Many of these reasons
echo the separation-of-powers concerns that Judge Bork recited
in favor of judicial restraint regarding the ATS.
First, "the prevailing conception of the common law has
changed since 1789 in a way that counsels restraint in judicially
applying internationally generated norms."71 Second, there has
been "an equally significant rethinking of the role of the federal
courts in making" common law since the Court's decision in
Erie.72 Third, "a decision to create a private right of action is one
better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases."73 Fourth, "the potential implications for the foreign relations
66
67
68

69
70
71
72

73

Id at 713, 724.
Id at 724.

Id.
Sosa, 542 US at 724-25.
Id at 725-28.
Id at 725.
Id at 726, citing Erie, 304 US at 78 ("There is no federal general common law.").
Sosa, 542 US at 727.
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of the United States of recognizing [new private causes of action
for violating international law] should make courts particularly
wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs."74 Citing Judge
Bork's Tel-Oren concurrence, the Court continued that "[s]ince
many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if
at all, with great caution."75 Fifth, courts "have no congressional
mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of
the law of nations, and modern indications of congressional understanding of the judicial role in the field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity."76 According to the
Court, "[t]hese reasons argue for great caution in adapting the
law of nations to private rights."77
Applying this cautious approach, the Sosa Court concluded
that Alvarez's claim for arbitrary abduction and detention in
Mexico did not qualify as a tort "in violation of the law of nations" within the meaning of the ATS.78 Even assuming that Sosa was acting on behalf of a government,79 the Court concluded
"that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the
transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well
defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy."80 The
Court's approach construed the ATS narrowly but left the door
"ajar" to recognition under the statute of "a narrow class of international [torts] today."81 Without purporting to identify "the
ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under" the ATS, the Court was "persuaded that federal
courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less

Id.
Id at 727-28, citing Tel-Oren, 726 F2d 774, 813 (Bork concurring).
Sosa, 542 US at 728.
77 Id.
78 Id at 724, 738.
79 The Court noted that to establish a violation of international law, Alvarez would
have had to "establish that Sosa was acting on behalf of a government when he made the
arrest" and then show that the government in question, as a matter of state policy, practiced, encouraged, or condoned prolonged arbitrary detention. Id at 737.
80 Sosa, 542 US at 738.
81 Id at 729.
74
75
76
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definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted."82
Following Sosa, some proponents of a broad interpretation
of the ATS suggested that the Supreme Court had essentially
embraced Filartiga's interpretation of the ATS. According to
Professor Ralph Steinhardt, "the Court endorsed the interpretation of the ATS adopted in Filartigaand its progeny" and "effectively put alien tort litigation where it was after Filartiga."83He
based this assessment on the fact that the Court cited Filartiga
"with approval" and held that "no additional statutory cause of
action was necessary" to bring claims under the ATS.84 This assessment overlooks the significant limits that the Sosa Court
placed on ATS suits going forward. As noted, the Court agreed
with Judge Bork's conclusion that the ATS is purely a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action. Like Judge Bork,
the Court assumed that the First Congress believed that the
common law would supply a cause of action for a limited number
of claims under the statute. And, like Judge Bork, the Court assumed that the First Congress probably enacted the ATS to provide jurisdiction to hear claims for torts analogous to the three
crimes against the law of nations identified by Blackstone.
To be sure, the Sosa Court seemed to suggest a slightly
larger role for the ATS than Judge Bork envisioned-but the
scope of this potential opening is not entirely clear. Judge Bork
acknowledged that his "thoughts as to the possible original intention underlying [the ATS] are admittedly speculative, and
those who enacted the law may well have had additional torts in
mind."85 The Sosa Court also suggested that the ATS may cover
torts beyond the Blackstone crimes but declined to identify "the
ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under" the ATS.86 Rather, it stated only that courts
should not recognize private claims "for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations" than the Blackstone paradigms.87
Commentators like Professor Steinhardt argue that Sosa endorsed
82

Id at 732.

Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. AlvarezMachain and the Future of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57
Vand L Rev 2241, 2244 & n 5 (2004).
84 Id at 2245.
85
Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 815 (Bork concurring).
86 Sosa, 542 US at 731-32.
87 Id at 732.
83
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the approach taken by lower courts in cases like Filartigabecause the Sosa opinion "cit[ed] Filartiga with approval."88 This
citation followed the Court's statement that its limited approach
to judicial recognition of private claims "is generally consistent
with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced
the issue before it reached this Court."89 Without more, however,
this vague statement makes it difficult to predict how the Court
would have actually decided these other cases. All one can say
for certain is that Sosa denied relief and construed the ATS to be
a jurisdictional statute that permitted adjudication of only a
narrow class of claims under the law of nations.
The Supreme Court interpreted the ATS again in Kiobel v
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.90 There, a group of Nigerian nationals (residing in the United States as legal residents) filed an
ATS suit in federal court against certain Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations, alleging that they aided and abetted the
Nigerian government in committing various international human rights violations in Nigeria, including extrajudicial killings,
crimes against humanity, and torture.9 1 The Second Circuit held
that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction under the
ATS over claims against corporate defendants,92 and the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to decide that question.93
After oral argument, however, the Court ordered the parties to
brief and argue the following question: "Whether and under
what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause
of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the
territory of a sovereign other than the United States."94
After reargument, the Supreme Court applied the presumption against extraterritorial application of US law to affirm the
Second Circuit's dismissal of the case. 5 The Court acknowledged

Steinhardt, 57 Vand L Rev at 2250 (cited in note 83).
Sosa, 542 US at 732, citing Filartiga,630 F2d at 890.
90 See Kiobel, 133 S Ct at 1662.
91 Id at 1662-63.
92 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 621 F3d 111, 120 (2d Cir 2010).
93 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, No 101491, *i (filed June 6 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 2326721) (framing the
question presented as "[w]hether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of nations such as torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide ... or if
corporations may be sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant under the ATS for such egregious violations"); Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 132 S Ct
472, 472-73 (2011) (granting the petition for certiorari).
94 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 132 S Ct 1738, 1738 (2012).
95 Kiobel, 133 S Ct at 1664-65.
88
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that the presumption ordinarily applies to discern whether an
Act of Congress regulating conduct applies abroad, and reaffirmed Sosa's conclusion that the ATS is "strictly jurisdictional"
and thus "does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief."96
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that "the principles underlying the canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS."97
In particular, the Court noted that "the danger of unwarranted
judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified
in the context of the ATS."98 According to the Court, to rebut the
presumption, the ATS would need to evince a clear indication of
extraterritoriality, and the Court found no such indication in the
text and history of the statute. The Court thought it "implausible to suppose that the First Congress wanted their fledgling
Republic-struggling to receive international recognition-to be
the first," in the words of Justice Story, "to be the custos morum
of the whole world."99
The Supreme Court's opinion in Kiobel-like its opinion in
Sosa-has more in common with Judge Bork's opinion in TelOren than the Second Circuit's opinion in Filartiga.The Court
adhered to its position that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action. It also reiterated Sosa's suggestion that, when the ATS was enacted, the First Congress was
focused "on the 'three principal offenses against the law of nations' that had been identified by Blackstone: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy."100 Finally, the Court invoked separation of powers as a rea-

son for narrowly construing a statute that could have a profound
impact on the United States's relations with foreign nations. In
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality and generally echoing Judge Bork's interpretation of the statute, the Kiobel Court arguably foreclosed lower court decisions like Filartiga in the future. Kiobel did not cite Filartiga, but the
presumption that the Court applied presumably would have
precluded adjudication of the claims at issue in Filartigasince

97

Id at 1664, quoting Sosa, 542 US at 713.
Kiobel, 133 S Ct at 1664.

98

Id.

99

Id at

96

1668.

100 Id at 1670, quoting Sosa, 542 US at 723-24.
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they-like the claims in Kiobel-were brought by aliens against
other aliens for conduct occurring outside the United States.101
CONCLUSION
Judge Bork's academic and judicial writings have profoundly
influenced the law in many areas. Although he is best known for
his contributions to antitrust law and constitutional interpretation, few have recognized the full measure of his contribution to
our understanding of the role of international law in the US legal
system. The Second Circuit's opinion in Filartigahas rightly received extensive attention.102 It was the first decision in over two
hundred years to use the ATS as a means of providing relief to one
alien against another for conduct occurring outside the United
States. To do so, it read the ATS quite broadly. Four years later,
Judge Bork read the statute more narrowly and attempted to
identify the expectations of the First Congress in enacting the
ATS. His stated goal was to guard against judicial intrusion into
the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the
federal government. Although Filartigahas received more attention over the years, Judge Bork's approach in Tel-Oren better anticipated the path of the law, as evidenced by the Supreme
Court's opinions in both Sosa and Kiobel.

101 The Court did not spell out in detail how the presumption against extraterritorial application of US law would apply in future ATS litigation. In Kiobel, the presumption
applied because all relevant conduct occurred outside the United States. The Court added without elaboration that "even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application." Kiobel, 133 S Ct at 1669. Justice Kennedy concurred in the
Court's opinion, but added that "the proper implementation of the presumption against
extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation" in
cases not covered by "the reasoning and holding of today's case." Id (Kennedy concurring).
102 See, for example, Harold Hongiu Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100
Yale L J 2347, 2366-68 (1991); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L
Rev 815, 831-34 (1997) (criticizing the Filartigacourt's reliance on pre-Erie precedents).
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